In January, [Dick Marchinko](http:\/\/www.dickmarcinko.com\/) spoke to my company. Here are some of the lessons that I drew from his hard-to-follow speech:<\/p>\n
Most importantly, he said, there is no substitute for human intelligence.<\/p>\n
Attackers can…<\/p>\n
1. defeat security systems, such as locks, by replacing them with their own security system in advance of a break-in. Security response will trust in their security system to help catch or contain attackers, not realizing that it was replaced and turned to the service of the attacker.
\n1. use decoys to mislead security response. For example, crews might diffuse one bomb, and they forget to look for a second one.
\n1. attack during noisy, chaotic, busy times, like shift-change. (My note: Hackers like to hide their malware on busy networks and on busy file servers, such as in university or ISP networks.)
\n1. trip alarms to assess response capabilities. Once assessed, booby-trap the response capabilities so they are ineffective.
\n1. evade security systems. TSA secures airports from passengers, but what about security airport construction sites and access? America’s ports and waterways are largely unprotected.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In January, [Dick Marchinko](http:\/\/www.dickmarcinko.com\/) spoke to my company. Here are some of the lessons that I drew from his hard-to-follow speech: Most importantly, he said, there is no substitute for human intelligence. Attackers can… 1. defeat security systems, such as locks, by replacing them with their own security system in advance of a break-in. Security … <\/p>\n